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QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
OVERVIEW
As of the cut-off date of this report (24 June), the results of the referendum held the 
previous day in the United Kingdom on this country’s continuing membership of the 
European Union (EU)1 have become known. A majority voted in favour of leaving the EU, 
which has triggered very sharp movements on global financial markets. Against this 
background of heightened uncertainty, the main central banks have announced 
extraordinary liquidity-providing measures to counter the increased volatility on markets. 
In this respect, it should be stressed that it is still very early to determine what portion of 
this initial reaction by the financial markets reflects the impact that the results of the British 
referendum may entail in the medium and long term as opposed to the temporary effects 
related to the sharp rise in volatility associated with the assimilation of news of this 
importance. 
Prior to the referendum news, there had been some timidly positive developments in the 
world economy since the publication of the previous Quarterly Report. As regards the non-
euro area advanced economies, the latest information, following the easing in activity at 
the start of the year, had provided more favourable signs. Among the emerging economies, 
meanwhile, the expansionary stance of demand policies in China appears to be stabilising 
this economy in the short term. Oil prices firmed on the rising trend on which they embarked 
in late January. Indeed, this would appear to be one of the factors behind the calm that 
marked global financial market developments for most of the quarter. However, since early 
June, the persistence of factors of vulnerability in the world economy has become patent, 
as the uncertainty surrounding the result of the referendum in the United Kingdom paved 
the way for a bout of turbulence that has been greatly magnified by the outcome of the 
consultation, as indicated. 
In the euro area, there was an upward surprise in GDP growth in Q1, although this appears 
to have been associated with essentially temporary factors. As a result, it has not led 
expected medium-term growth to be revised, as may be inferred from the latest Eurosystem 
projections2, which remain unchanged for the 2017-2018 period, albeit subject to downside 
risks, in particular owing to the UK referendum result. Inflation in the area continues to 
show no signs of picking up, with some additional negative surprises in the latest data, 
which have translated into a downward revision of the projected growth rate for core 
inflation in the short term.
In Spain, the information available points as before to the continuation of the upturn in 
activity. In Q1, GDP grew by 0.8%, a rate matching that observed in the two preceding 
quarters and 0.1 pp up on the Banco de España’s projection in its March Quarterly Report. 
The Quarterly National Accounts detailed a continuing expansionary course for domestic 
demand, while the contribution of net external demand to the increase in GDP was 
negative, against a background in which trade flows weakened notably. 
1  The referendum had been called to ratify the European Council’s February 2016 resolution on the United 
Kingdom’s special status in the European Union. See the article (in Spanish) Acuerdo sobre un nuevo régimen 
para el Reino Unido en la Unión Europea in the March 2016 Boletín Económico.
2  The projections for the euro area as a whole are available at: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/
eurosystemstaffprojections201606.en.pdf, and those for the Spanish economy at: http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/
INF/MenuVertical/AnalisisEconomico/AnalisisEconomico/ProyeccionesMacroeconomicas/ficheros/be1606-
proye.pdf.
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The latest conjunctural information continues to point to robust growth in activity. 
Specifically, GDP is estimated to have increased at a quarter-on-quarter rate of 0.7% in Q2. 
From the demand standpoint, the composition of this increase in output is not expected to 
have changed substantially from that observed in the opening stretch of the year. Hence, 
favourable labour market developments and improved financial conditions are expected to 
have continued sustaining the expansion in household consumption, at a very similar rate 
to that of the previous quarters, while business investment has slowed somewhat, but held 
nonetheless on an expansionary path. The residential component of investment in 
construction is estimated to have continued picking up, against the backdrop of the rise 
in house sales. The recent weakness of some indicators, such as cement consumption or 
Social Security registrations in the civil engineering sector, suggests that investment in 
other construction might be feeling the impact of a slowdown in public works. 
The still very limited information on trade with the rest of the world in real terms in Q2 
suggests a rise in goods exports, in a setting in which euro area markets retain their growth 
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
a Year-on-year rate of change based on seasonally adjusted series in the case of GDP and on original series in consumer price indices.
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SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Information available to 24 June 2016.
b Contribution to the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of GDP (pp).
c Latest available figure for consumer price indices: May 2016.
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momentum. Conversely, sales to the rest of the world are estimated to have continued 
showing, in comparative terms, less firmness, as a result of the weakness of certain 
emerging regions and of the modest exchange rate appreciation. The expansionary 
behaviour of exports has, moreover, been supported by the prolongation of the positive 
trajectory of tourist service flows. In net terms, the contribution of the external balance 
might ultimately be more favourable than in the preceding quarter, potentially posting 
neutral or slightly positive figures. 
Inflation has in recent months recorded somewhat higher declines than those foreseen a 
quarter ago, reflecting the slowdown in its core component. The inflation differential vis-à-
vis the euro area has held in recent months at ‑1 pp, owing to the energy component. 
Thus, in terms of the HICP excluding energy, the differential has stood at zero since the 
start of the year, after having evidenced negative figures since mid-2013. 
The report includes six boxes devoted, respectively, to the analysis of the oil market 
outlook (Box 1), progress in the third assistance programme for Greece (Box 2), general 
government budgetary developments in the first half of the year (Box 3), the European 
Commission’s recommendations in respect of the European semester (Box 4), the 
competitive adjustment of the Spanish automobile industry (Box 5) and recent developments 
in Spanish SMEs’ access to financing (Box 6). 
24.6.2016.
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From 2014 H2 to January 2016 the price of crude oil decreased by 
75% to a low of $28 dollars per barrel of Brent(see Chart 1). This 
decline occurred against a backdrop of the progressive 
transformation of the oil industry in the US due to the expansion of 
shale oil and the reaction of the OPEC, particularly that of Saudi 
Arabia, which ceased to accommodate production to stabilise prices 
and so avoid the entry of new competitors. However, crude oil prices 
have gradually recovered since February, climbing to more than $50 
a barrel, due to both supply and demand issues. With respect to 
supply, at first the price thrust was explained by signs of a possible 
agreement between the OPEC and Russia to contain production; 
subsequently, temporary supply disruptions in Canada and Nigeria, 
together with a sustained fall in production in the US as the 
improvements in yields from its extractive technologies tapered off, 
reduced the supply to the market. Demand issues have also gained 
importance as the main tail risks to global growth envisaged in early 
2016 – a hard landing of the Chinese economy or a recession in the 
United States – began to clear. In any event, crude oil production 
continues to exceed consumption and OECD stocks are very high. 
Analysts’ projections point to a gradual and limited price recovery 
until 2017 (see Chart 1). The price of futures maturing in December 
2016 and 2017 is $50 and $53 per barrel of Brent oil, respectively. 
The outlook for oil prices at medium term will depend on the 
relative incidence of three factors: (i) agreements within the OPEC 
and Iran’s output increase; (ii) non-OPEC producers’ supply 
response, particularly of shale oil in the US; and (iii) on the demand 
side, the macroeconomic risks in China and other EMEs. This Box 
focuses especially on supply-side issues: the situation in the 
OPEC following the lifting of sanctions on Iran; and the production 
of shale oil in the US. 
Independently of the changes in prices and crude oil production in 
the rest of the world, since 2014 OPEC production commenced to 
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b WTI oil price per barrel in 2014 dollars; the shock starts in July 2016.
c In the four major areas of shale oil production.
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increase as a result of Saudi Arabia having abandoned its 
traditional policy of accommodating production (see Chart 2).1 The 
purpose was allowing prices to fall in order to, on the one hand, 
discourage production of shale oil in the US (more costly to 
produce), and, on the other, hamper Iran’s repositioning following 
the lifting of international sanctions. Thus, at its half-yearly meeting 
in December 2015, the OPEC postponed its official production 
target until Iran’s increase in production could be assessed, which 
was interpreted as a sign of weakness of the cartel. Nor have 
agreements been reached in 2016 at the meetings of OPEC 
members with Russia in April or at those among OPEC members 
only in June, as a result of Saudi Arabia’s refusal to freeze 
production if the agreement was not binding for Iran. Additionally, 
Saudi Arabia is currently involved in the privatisation of its state oil 
company, Aramco, which could lead to increased production, 
especially if climate change or energy efficiency issues curb the 
demand for oil at long term. 
Moreover, the so-called “shale oil revolution” that started around 
2010 gave rise to an enormous increase in crude production in the 
US, thanks to the introduction of new extraction methods like 
hydraulic fracturing (see Chart 2). Considering the initial cost of 
these projects, the US’s production resilience after the abrupt price 
drop was a surprise at first. Some reasons include productivity 
increases achieved in drilling and hydraulic fracturing due to cost 
falls decreases (wages, services and electricity) of more than 10 %, 
and lower royalties and taxes linked to the value of production. 
Greater productivity and lower input costs have given rise to 
substantial decreases in the variable costs of operating wells and 
in the breakeven on the new wells. At short term, production 
continues in an existing well provided that prices cover the variable 
costs. It is estimated that the weighted average variable cost 
dropped from $28 to $24 per barrel between 2013 and 2014 
(although it increases with crude oil price). Additionally, extraction 
projects will be initiated if the expected trend for oil prices renders 
the new oil operations profitable, including all costs. These price 
estimates, which have been falling, are in the $50 to $80 range, so 
the current prices would be at the lower limit needed to guarantee 
the economic viability of shale oil production at long term. The 
slight increase recorded in oil rigs after the recovery of crude oil 
prices supports this hypothesis (see Chart 3). 
Based on current prices, the US Energy Information Administration 
foresees that shale oil production will decrease in the short term 
but will recover at medium term, fuelled by future productivity 
gains. In this regard, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
expects that productivity improvements will give rise to increased 
shale oil production from 2017 and will match in 2020 the maximum 
level recorded in 2015.2 Only a scenario of prices lower than $40 
per barrel over a lengthy period of time would give rise to significant 
output declines at medium term (see Chart 4). 
In short, the supply glut is expected to continue in 2016 in the 
absence of an OPEC agreement. Starting in 2017, oil prices could 
increase slightly due to the impact on global supply of the depletion 
of certain wells and investment contraction, exacerbated by the 
financial pressures on the energy industry. The high levels of 
stocks and the economic viability of shale oil in the US at the 
current prices will tend to limit price rises at medium term. 
BOX 1 OUTLOOK FOR THE OIL MARKET (cont’d)
1  Saudi Arabia, the OPEC’s major producer with output in excess of 10 
mbd, also holds the largest spare capacity (around 2 mbd).  Its behaviour 
is key for the cartel, since other large producers such as Iraq, Iran or 
Venezuela have traditionally not complied with their output quotas and 
have tried to produce at their maximum capacity.  Following the lifting of 
sanctions against Iran, the OPEC’s third largest producer, there has been 
a 0.7 mbd rebound in production that could rise in the future if Iran 
manages to increase its installed capacity by attracting new investment. 
2  “The Outlook for U.S. Production of Shale Oil” by Mark Lasky, CBO 
Working Paper 2016-01.
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On 24 May 2016, the Eurogroup reached an agreement with the 
Greek government and the IMF that permits the completion of the 
first review of the programme and paves the way for the 
disbursement of the second tranche of financial assistance.1 
Further, the agreement allowed the ECB once again to accept 
Greek debt as collateral for its monetary policy operations. For the 
first time, the agreement envisages the sequential introduction of 
a set of debt relief measures that are conditional upon compliance 
with the programme. Although these measures have still not been 
fully specified, it was agreed that they would be of a sufficient 
magnitude to keep Greece’s financing needs below 15% of GDP 
in the medium term and below 20% thereafter.
Since the third assistance programme was launched, the Greek 
government has been making headway in the process of structural 
reform of the economy. In particular, relatively fast progress has 
been made in recapitalising the banks, a process that has now 
been completed. There has also been progress on the fiscal front, 
although this has taken the form of spending cuts that are not 
sufficiently supported by structural reforms and no action has 
been taken to broaden the contribution bases. These developments 
meant that, despite the capital controls put in place in the summer 
of 2015, GDP growth and the fiscal performance in 2015 surpassed 
the expectations prevailing at the start of the programme. At the 
same time, however, the implementation of certain measures – 
considered key to setting debt back on a path to more sustainable 
levels – continued to be postponed, leading to a delay in the 
completion of the first review of this third programme.
BOX 2 PROGRESS MADE IN THE THIRD ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME FOR GREECE
2013 2014 2015
  2.0-  7.0  2.3-)a( PDG
Unemployment (b) 27.5 26.5 24.9
1.1-4.1-9.0-)a( PCIH
Current account balance (c) -2.0 -2.1 -0.1
Unit labour costs (a) -7.4 -2.6 0.4
Total budget balance (c) -12.4 -3.6 -7.2
Primary budget balance (c) -8.4 0.4 -3.4
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SOURCES: National Bank of Greece, IMF and the Hellenic Statistical Authority.
a Annual rate of change.
b Percentage of labour force.
c Percentage of GDP.
1  The third assistance programme for Greece was approved in August 
2015 and will run until August 2018. The programme provided for a 
disbursement of €86 billion, of which €21.4 billion was disbursed in 
2015. The disbursement of each tranche is conditional on the passing of 
concrete measures. The second tranche of assistance (€10.3 billion) was 
approved by the Board of Governors of the European Stability 
Mechanism on 16 June 2016, as follows: €7.5 billion in June 2016 to 
cover debt maturities and deferred State expenditure, and the remainder 
after the summer, subject to verification that deferred State expenditure 
has indeed been reduced.
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For this reason, the Greek government has recently approved new 
reforms to the pension system and the tax system and to 
modernise public administration, and has launched the asset 
privatisation fund and a new insolvency proceeding to deal with 
bad loans. Finally, with a view to the final agreement, Greece 
passed parametric fiscal measures amounting to 3% of GDP and 
a contingency mechanism that makes the adoption of structural 
reforms or tax rises binding, in the event of deviations from the 
primary surplus target.
In the agreement reached in May, the creditors recognise the 
progress that has been made, but also highlight that much remains 
to be done. Specifically, additional reforms to improve 
competitiveness and increase productivity in the Greek economy 
are still on hold. These affect very sensitive areas, such as 
competition in markets for goods and services, and collective 
bargaining.
Thus, a high level of uncertainty still remains regarding the ability 
of the Greek economy to achieve the productivity gains that would 
support sustained growth over the medium term and maintain a 
sufficient fiscal surplus to enable the continuing high levels of 
public debt to be reduced. As a result, the creditors have agreed 
for the first time to introduce debt relief measures that address the 
complex outlook foreseen by the available projections of public 
debt and the financing needs of the economy (see Charts 2 and 3). 
These play a key role when it comes to assessing the sustainability 
of Greece’s public finances, given the high proportion of debt held 
by official creditors at low interest rates (see Chart 1). In this 
regard, recent analyses performed by both the IMF and the 
European creditors concur in anticipating that the evolution of 
Greek debt will not be sustainable without relief measures, both 
because it is not returning to a downward trajectory over the 
medium term, and because the country would be faced with 
financing needs that are too high and that it would have to fund at 
non-concessional interest rates in the market. Therefore, a key 
part of the agreement – which opens the door to the possibility of 
the IMF participating in the programme – is the relief measures 
that aim to keep Greece’s financing needs below 15% of GDP 
over the medium term, and below 20% subsequently.
These measures, which are sequential in nature, are still not 
precisely defined, so that it is difficult to calculate their scope in 
terms of the discounted present value of the debt.2 In the short 
term, before the conclusion of the programme in 2018, these 
measures include the possibility of smoothing the maturity profiles 
of the loans from the European Financial Stability Facility (without 
altering their average maturity of 31.5 years) and using the 
financing strategy of the European Stability Mechanism to reduce 
the interest rate risk spreads applied to loans to Greece. In the 
medium term, and subject to the satisfactory conclusion of the 
programme and compliance with the fiscal criteria, it would be 
possible, among other things, to use the surplus funds from the 
programme (€20 billion assigned to recapitalisation, which has not 
been used) for early repayment of the loans from the IMF, which 
are relatively more expensive, and to smooth the maturity profiles. 
These funds could also be used, if necessary, to extend the terms 
of the loans from the European Financial Stability Facility and 
impose limits on the interest payments to ensure that the financing 
needs comply with the established framework criterion. In the long 
term, and also subject to compliance with the primary surplus 
criterion of 3.5% of GDP and with the requirements of the Stability 
and Growth Pact, a mechanism could be established for 
introducing additional relief measures that may be necessary to 
satisfy the criterion for the maximum financing needs.
BOX 2PROGRESS MADE IN THE THIRD ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME FOR GREECE (cont’d)
2  The IMF’s proposal, which is much more detailed, entails relief of 50 pp 
of GDP at discounted present value.
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BOX 3 DEVELOPMENTS IN GENERAL GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS
The latest figures on the general government  sector in National 
Accounts terms refer to the first quarter of 2016 and cover the 
central government, the regional governments and the Social 
Security system (see accompanying table).1 According to that 
information, the general government sub-sectors combined 
posted a deficit in January-March of 0.8% of GDP, similar to the 
figure recorded in the same period of 2015.
Consolidated general government (excluding local government) 
revenue was virtually unchanged year-on-year in the quarter, 
compared with the increase of 3.2% recorded in 2015, mainly as a 
result of the performance of direct and indirect tax revenues. The latest 
data, for April, on revenue from taxes shared by central, regional and 
local governments show a continuation of that revenue weakness at 
the start of the second quarter.
In turn, general government (excluding local government) 
expenditure rose by 0.5% year-on-year to March, compared with 
1  Monthly National Accounts figures released by the National Audit Office 
(IGAE).
€m
2015
Jan-Dec
2015
Jan-Dec
2015
Jan-Mar
2016
Jan-Mar
Official targets
2016
5.3 5.0-6.02.3427,863)b( secruoser latoT  1
9.5 3.0-0.54.7841,201stropmi dna noitcudorp no sexaT    
6.0 2.01-9.30.4511,101sexat htlaew dna emocnI    
0.39.15.07.1870,231snoitubirtnoc laicoS    
1.52.82 3.03- 1.5-383,33)b( secruoser rehtO    
1.03.05.11.1574,614)b( sesu latoT  2
7.21.04.45.3345,79noitasnepmoc eeyolpmE    
 0.1-8.18.01.3871,56)d( erutidnepxe noitpmusnoc lanif rehtO    
7.14.1 2.0- 2.0-748,961)dnik ni ton( stifeneb laicoS    
 5.3- 6.5- 9.3- 1.6-894,23diap tseretni lautcA    
 3.1- 6.83-0.071.21201,11seidisbuS    
 — 7.8-8.5 8.4-359,41)b( srefsnart tnerruc dna sesu rehtO    
 5.51-3.8 5.3-8.52793,02noitamrof latipac ssorG    
 — 6.92- 6.53-759,4)b( erutidnepxe latipac rehtO    
€m
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
2015
Jan-Dec
2015
Jan-Dec
2015
Jan-Mar
2016
Jan-Mar
Official targets
2016
 6.3- 8.0- 8.0- 4.5-385,06-)c( )3.3 + 2.3+ 1.3 = 3( etagergga detadilosnoC  3
 8.1- 8.0- 9.0- 5.2-920,92-)c( tnemnrevoG lartneC 1.3    
 1.1-2.03.0 3.1-295,31-sdnuf ytiruceS laicoS 2.3    
 7.0- 1.0- 2.0- 7.1-269,71-tnemnrevoG lanoigeR 3.3    
0.0 —1.04.0567,4tnemnrevoG lacoL  4
 6.3- — 7.0- 0.5-818,55-)c( )4 + 3 = 5( tnemnrevoG lareneG latoT  5
Memorandum item
 —0.00.0 1.0-358-)e( snoitutitsni laicnanif ot diA
1.995.0012.0012.99071,270,1)PDE( tbed cilbuP
Year-on-year rate of change
As a percentage of annual nominal GDP (f)
Table 1
DEVELOPMENTS IN GENERAL GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS (a)
SOURCES: IGAE and Stability Programme (2016-2019).
a The revenue and expenditure data refer to the accounts of the central government, regional government and Social Security funds consolidated aggregate. Local 
government data are therefore not included, since monthly information is not available.
b Consolidated figures for transfers to other general government tiers (local government).
c Excludes aid to financial institutions. 
d Includes inputs and market producers’ social transfers in kind.
e Capital transfers granted to financial institutions.
f For 2016 the annual nominal GDP envisaged in the Stability Programme (2016-2019) was taken. In the case of debt, GDP at market prices was prepared drawing 
on the official series of the Quarterly National Accounts published by INE, aggregating the last four quarters for each reference date.
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BOX 3 DEVELOPMENTS IN GENERAL GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS (cont’d)
an increase of 1.2% in the same period of 2015, although this 
more restrained growth was partly due to the base effect of the 
temporary impact on wage expenditure in 2015 Q1 of the payment 
to public-sector employees of one-quarter of the “extraordinary” 
salary payment (equivalent to one-fourteenth of annual wages) 
that was suspended in December 2012. For its part, government 
consumption remained robust in real terms in 2016 Q1, according 
to Quarterly National Accounts.
General government debt as a proportion of GDP rose by 1.4 pp in 
2016 Q1 to 100.5%. In any event, the decline in average financing 
costs meant that borrowing costs as a proportion of GDP 
continued to decline, down to 3.1% (see accompanying chart). 
The breakdown by instrument shows that the main financing 
channel for general government in the first quarter continued to be 
issuance of long-term securities. The breakdown by holder shows 
that the main net purchasers of these securities in the period were 
non-residents and credit institutions.
At end-April, the Spanish government submitted the Stability 
Programme Update (SPU) to the European Commission. The 
SPU establishes the main lines of budgetary policy for the period 
2016-2019. It sets the general government budget deficit target 
for 2016 at 3.6% of GDP, compared with the existing 2.8% 
target set by the European Council in the framework of the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) in July 2013. In order to meet 
the official target, the budget deficit would have to fall by 1.5 pp 
of GDP in 2016. According to the SPU, this improvement would 
be achieved as a result of the positive cyclical developments 
forecast, given that the fiscal policy stance envisaged is 
practically neutral, with a change in the general government’s 
primary structural balance of ‑0.2  pp of GDP. The SPU also 
includes budget deficit targets for the medium term, specifically 
2.9%, 2.2% and 1.6% of GDP in 2017, 2018 and 2019, 
respectively, which would set back the commitment to exit the 
“excessive deficit” situation established in the EDP (a deficit 
over 3% of GDP) by one year to 2017.
This year, the improvement in the general government deficit would 
be concentrated, according to the SPU, on the reduction in public 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP (‑1.5 pp), while public revenue 
would remain unchanged as a proportion of GDP. The SPU’s 
expenditure projections are based on the measures already included 
in the budgets of the various tiers of general government, adding in 
a set of corrective measures recently adopted by the central 
government (expenditure cuts amounting to €2  billion) and the 
regional governments (expenditure cuts and adjustments for non-
execution of budget already envisaged, amounting to €1.5 billion). 
The assumption in the SPU that revenue will remain unchanged 
as a proportion of GDP stems from the fact that the impact of the 
personal and corporate income tax reforms, with an estimated 
overall cost of some 0.3 pp of GDP, is expected to be more than 
offset by the application of certain administrative measures 
(particularly relating to the fight against fraud) and, especially, by 
the estimated degree of responsiveness of taxes to changes in 
the tax bases.
The SPU also sets out government debt targets. Specifically, 
government debt as a proportion of GDP is expected to continue 
on the downward path that began in 2015, to reach 99.1% in 2016. 
This pattern is expected to continue throughout the time horizon of 
the Programme, backed by the primary budget surpluses foreseen 
and the continuation of sustained economic growth, such that 
government debt as a proportion of GDP is estimated at 99%, 
97.9% and 96% in 2017, 2018 and 2019, respectively.
Overall, in light of the budget outturn figures available, in order to 
meet the budget deficit target set in the SPU for this year, the 
increase in revenue and/or containment of expenditure in the rest of 
2016 will have to be greater than that observed in the opening 
months of the year. Specifically, revenue will have to improve in 
coming quarters to move closer to the official forecast of an increase 
in revenue of 3.5% in 2016 as a whole. In turn, in order to meet the 
aggregated public expenditure target of an increase of 0.1%, the 
budget outturn will have to be strict at all tiers of general government.
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
 NON-TRADE CREDIT AND OTHER  MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM SECURITIES
 SHORT-TERM SECURITIES  GROSS FINANCING
%
Chart 1
GROSS FINANCING
Rate (y-o-y) and contribution by instrument
SOURCE: Banco de España.
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
 INTEREST BURDEN  DEBT (right-hand scale)
% of GDP
Chart 2
INTEREST BURDEN AND DEBT RATIO
Cumulative four-quarter data
% of GDP
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JUNE 2016 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
In 2011, the European Union set up an annual cycle of economic 
policy coordination between Member States known as the 
“European semester”. It encompasses the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure and the Excessive Deficit Procedure and 
follows a timeline which is summarised in the accompanying 
diagram. The objectives of this process are to identify the 
emergence of fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances early on, to 
supervise the implementation of the policies required to correct 
these imbalances, and, lastly, to contribute to achieving the 
medium-term objectives of the European 2020 Growth Strategy. 
Based on the analyses it has performed in the course of this year, 
the European Commission (EC) presented a set of economic 
policy recommendations to the various Member States on 18 May 
2016. These are known as the country-specific recommendations 
or CSR, and are to be approved by the European Council over the 
coming weeks. This box gives an overview of the main 
developments of the past eight months and describes the 
recommendations for Spain. 
The 2016 European semester kicked off in November 2015 with the 
publication, by the EC, of a set of three documents, which notably 
included the Alert Mechanism Report (AMR), the content of which is 
described below. The second document is the Annual Growth 
Survey which, like the AMR, affects the EU as a whole and 
establishes three areas for priority action, with the objective of 
boosting job creation and economic growth. In particular, the EC 
highlights the importance of re-launching investment, pursuing 
structural reforms and implementing fiscal policies to enhance 
budgetary consolidation. Lastly, the EC published, for the first time 
within the framework of the European semester, its recommendations 
for the euro area as a whole, aimed at reinforcing coordination of the 
country-specific recommendations.
The AMR uses a scoreboard of economic and social indicators to 
identify countries which require a closer analysis known as the “in-
depth review”. As a new feature, the scoreboard presented in the 
latest report includes three new indicators relating to employment 
(activity rate, long-term unemployment and youth unemployment) 
to strengthen the analysis of the consequences of the crisis on the 
labour market, since it is considered that they may adversely 
affect potential output and aggravate the risks associated with 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
Based on the review of the indicators, the EC deemed that it was 
necessary to carry out in-depth reviews for the majority of Member 
States.1 In the case of Spain, the Commission identified seven 
indicators which exceed the thresholds above which a country is 
deemed to experience imbalances (see Chart 1). Most of these 
indicators relate to stock variables which are subject to very 
gradual changes, and, therefore, correcting them at excessive 
levels is necessarily a slow process. These variables include the 
international investment position, and private and public debt 
which stood at 94.1% (net debtor position), 165.8% and 99.3% of 
GDP in 2014, exceeding, in some cases by a very ample margin, 
the respective thresholds of 35%, 133% and 60% above which 
imbalances are deemed to exist. The situation is similar with 
respect to the unemployment rate, whose average in the three-
year period (2012-2014) was significantly higher than the 
established threshold (10% for this variable). As regards flow 
indicators, there are imbalances in the long-term and youth 
unemployment rates, which increased by 4 pp and 7 pp, 
respectively, from 2012 to 2014, against the minimum thresholds 
of 0.5 pp and 2.2 pp, and in the world market share of Spanish 
exports, which fell by 0.2 pp in the five-year period (2012-2014), 
BOX 4THE 2016 EUROPEAN SEMESTER: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO SPAIN 
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Diagram 1
EUROPEAN SEMESTER: TIMELINE
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1  In-depth reviews have been performed on a total of 18 countries. Of 
these, Estonia and Austria have been reviewed for the first time, the 
former owing to demand pressures, and the latter, because of the 
difficulties facing its financial sector. Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, 
France, Croatia, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom are 
reviewed as a result of the imbalances detected in the previous European 
semester. Lastly, the supervision of imbalances in Greece and Cyprus 
and the monitoring of corrective measures are being conducted within 
the framework of their financial assistance programmes.
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approximately double the reduction on which basis imbalances 
are considered to exist.2 The values observed for the remaining 
flow indicators (current account balance, private sector asset and 
liability flows, changes in the activity rate or in the effective 
exchange rate, unit labour costs or house prices) are consistent 
with the absence of imbalances, given the established thresholds.
In February, the Commission published the in-depth reviews, with the 
objective of assessing the macroeconomic risks in each of the 
Member States subject to the procedure. If, on the basis of this 
assessment, the existing imbalances are deemed to be excessive, the 
EC will need to strengthen monitoring of the policies recommended to 
correct them. When determining whether or not the imbalances are 
excessive, the EC also takes into account compliance with the 
recommendations approved by the Council in the previous year. If 
these have been complied with, it is understood that the government 
is taking the necessary steps to correct the imbalances. 
In the in-depth review on Spain, the EC pointed out that although 
the imbalances have been reduced, partly as a result of structural 
policies, and cannot be classified as excessive, they have not 
disappeared and still pose risks for the future. Specifically, although 
the level of vulnerability is lower owing to the improvement in the 
current account balance, credit flows or the fiscal consolidation 
process, the still-high external debt, both public and private, and 
the unemployment rate, constitute elements of weakness in the 
event of shocks. The review also indicates that, although on track, 
private sector deleveraging still has some way to go, since a high 
percentage of households is still very vulnerable to possible interest 
rate increases. Likewise, the review highlights that the stronger-
than-expected GDP growth has not been used to reduce the 
government deficit and the debt ratio. 
According to the report, low productivity continues to be the main 
factor limiting growth in the long term. It is closely linked to the 
inefficient allocation of factors across firms and the mismatch 
between the labour force and labour market needs. As regards 
compliance with the recommendations approved by the European 
Council in 2015, the report endorses the measures adopted by the 
Spanish authorities in recent years, particularly with respect to the 
financial sector, the corporate and personal insolvency frameworks, 
and labour legislation. However, the Commission considers that 
there was limited compliance as regards assessment of healthcare 
spending, streamlining the minimum income schemes and 
liberalising professionals services (see Table).
In April 2016, the Member States submitted their Stability 
Programmes (in the case of euro area countries) or Convergence 
Programmes (in the case of the other Member states), along with 
their National Reform Programmes. These documents include 
economic policy proposals to address the problems identified. 
Based on the analysis of these documents, the European 
Commission published its economic policy recommendations for 
each Member State for the upcoming 12 months. The EU Council 
BOX 4 THE 2016 EUROPEAN SEMESTER: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO SPAIN (cont’d)
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2  With respect to this variable, it should be borne in mind that the loss of 
export market share in terms of world exports is a phenomenon that is 
common to the majority of European countries (and, in general, 
developed countries), owing to the incorporation of the emerging 
economies into the world trade scene. 
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will formally adopt the recommendations for each country shortly.3 
In the case of Spain, the EC recommends that measures be 
adopted in the following areas in 2016 and 2017:
1  Fiscal policy: ensure a correction of the excessive deficit by 
2017, reducing the imbalance in public finances to 3.7% of GDP 
in 2016 and to 2.5% of GDP in 2017. According to the EC’s 
calculations, this would mean a structural adjustment of 0.25 pp 
of GDP in 2016 and of 0.5 pp in 2017. In addition, it recommends 
using any hypothetical improvement in the projected budget 
outturn to speed up the consolidation process and implementing 
the tools set out in the Budgetary Stability Law to ensure that at 
all government levels contribute to achieving these objectives. It 
also recommends improving the control mechanisms for public 
procurement and coordination across government levels.
2  Labour market: encourage labour market integration, by 
focusing measures on training and individualised support. In 
addition, it recommends streamlining the existing schemes for 
guaranteed minimum income.
3  Education and innovation: provide incentives for cooperation 
between universities and firms in order to improve the 
matching of labour market needs to tertiary education skills. 
Increase performance-based funding of universities and 
public research centres and improve mechanisms to foster 
research by the private sector.
Product market: speed up implementation of the law on preserving 
market unity, ensure compliance by regional governments of the law 
on the retail trade and adopt the reform on professional services.
BOX 4 THE 2016 EUROPEAN SEMESTER: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO SPAIN (cont’d)
SOURCE: European Commission.
Table 1
SPAIN’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 2015 EUROPEAN SEMESTER
Substantial progress — Reform of savings banks.
Some progress 
— Transparency and accountability of regional public finances.
— Wage setting.
— Improve the quality and effectiveness of job search assistance and counselling, including as part of tackling youth 
unemployment.
— Remove the barriers which prevent businesses from growing.
Limited progress — Improve the cost-effectiveness of the healthcare sector and rationalise hospital pharmaceutical spending.
No progress — Professional services.
3  The Council is considered to have approved the Commission’s proposals 
and recommendations unless a qualified majority of countries vote 
against them.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JUNE 2016 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
BOX 5 THE CAR MANUFACTURING SECTOR IN SPAIN AS AN EXAMPLE OF COMPETITIVE ADJUSTMENT
The automotive sector in Spain was severely affected by the fall in 
demand due to the crisis.1 However, these branches of industry 
are among those which have shown the strongest recovery, 
perhaps because of certain of the sector’s structural features 
which may have facilitated its adjustment after the adverse shocks. 
In fact, Chart 1 shows that the sector’s production decreased by 
nearly 30% in 2009, compared with a fall of somewhat more than 
15% in other manufacturing industry as a whole. Nevertheless, 
after this sharp initial fall, the automotive sector showed high 
growth, which by end-2015 had lifted production to its pre-crisis 
level, while the other manufacturing sectors showed an 
approximately 20% gap with respect to their pre-crisis level. 
The strong performance shown by the sector from 2012 is partly 
attributable to demand factors. First, car manufacturing in Spain is 
an eminently export oriented activity, the main markets of which 
are the rest of the euro area, the core countries of which exited the 
crisis before Spain did. It is therefore natural that the automotive 
sector should recover more strongly than others whose sales 
depended to a larger extent on domestic demand. Second, the 
sector’s production was also stimulated by government-sponsored 
car purchase incentives which boosted the domestic component 
of demand. However, it should be taken into account that these 
measures also favoured car imports, the share of which in total car 
1  In this Box, the automotive sector is taken to be Division 29 of NACE 
Rev. 2, which comprises the following three subdivisions: manufacture 
of motor vehicles (Group 29.1), manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for 
motor vehicles (Group 29.2) and manufacture of parts and accessories 
for motor vehicles (Group 29.3).
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BOX 5
 
THE CAR MANUFACTURING SECTOR IN SPAIN AS AN EXAMPLE OF COMPETITIVE ADJUSTMENT (cont’d)
sales rose by six pp to 41% between 2011 and 2015. In addition, 
car purchase assistance programmes have also been operating in 
other European countries.
In sum, the existence of demand factors not very different from 
those in other European economies suggests that the strong 
relative performance of this sector’s production in Spain since 
2013 (see Chart 2) also has some other causes. In particular, the 
decrease in unit labour costs (ULCs) in relative terms compared 
with other producer countries (see Chart 3) has been a crucial 
factor in enabling Spanish factories to attract additional production 
volumes, materialised through foreign direct investment by foreign 
parent companies, which ultimately resulted in higher employment 
in the sector. The adjustment of ULCs has occurred, firstly, through 
wage moderation and, secondly, through adjustment of the total 
hours worked per employee. Indeed, compared with others, this 
sector showed a relatively high adjustment of this variable during 
the crisis, which, although having the attendant impact on 
compensation per worker, allowed workforces to be maintained.2 
A possible explanation for the different behaviour in this latter 
respect may lie in certain particularities of the labour relations 
framework that has been in place in the automotive industry for 
nearly two decades. Specifically, firm-level agreements in this 
sector are virtually the sole collective bargaining mechanism, 
affecting 99% of workers compared with a proportion below 10% 
in the rest of the economy. It seems reasonable to believe that this 
particularity may have given producers greater flexibility to change 
the parameters of labour conditions in response to shocks.
Certain financial factors may have also contributed to the strong 
performance of the sector in recent years. In particular, its 
investment decisions have not been particularly constrained by 
debt, which at 15 pp at the onset of the crisis was lower than that 
of manufacturing industry as a whole. In addition, there are 
reasons why national automotive sector producers have not 
suffered the financing difficulties of other industries when it 
comes to accessing traditional credit channels. Firstly, since the 
factories in Spain are subsidiaries of foreign multinationals, 
national producers make extensive use of intra-group financing, 
which represents 60% of the total (20 pp more than in the 
manufacturing sector as a whole – see Chart 4). Secondly, this 
sector resorts to a greater extent than others to financing through 
trade credit. The low financial burden of the sector, along with the 
recovery of demand, has allowed the sector to recoup its pre-
crisis level of profitability.
2  This was achieved in a variety of ways. For example, this sector is 
characterised by greater use of tools such as short-time working, flexible 
working hours or shift work. All these mechanisms allow the total hours 
worked to be adjusted to cope with unforeseen changes in demand.
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On 1 June the ECB released the results of the 14th edition of its 
survey on the access to finance of SMEs in the euro area (SAFE) 
covering the period between October 2015 and March 2016. The 
firms surveyed are asked how their economic and financial situation, 
their external financing needs and the conditions of the financing 
received or rejected have changed over the past six months.
The latest survey data show that, overall, the economic situation 
of Spanish SMEs has continued to improve. Thus, the number of 
firms reporting an increase in sales was once again much higher 
than the number of firms reporting a drop in sales, with a relative 
difference between the two groups (net percentage) of 20%, 
somewhat higher than in the euro area as a whole (16%) but lower 
than the figure for the previous six months (27%) (see Chart 1). The 
profit performance was somewhat less favourable, owing to the 
increase both in labour and other costs, a circumstance that was 
reported by a high net proportion of the sample (38% and 30%, 
respectively, compared with 44% and 29% in the euro area as a 
whole). Thus, the proportion of firms that reported an increase in 
profits was barely 2 pp higher than that which reported a drop 
in profits, 4 pp less than six months earlier. In the euro area as a 
whole, that difference remained slightly negative (-1 pp).
The indicators of access to external financing improved once 
again in the period analysed. Thus, the percentage of Spanish 
SMEs that classed this factor as the most pressing problem for 
BOX 6 RECENT CHANGES IN ACCESS OF SPANISH SMES TO EXTERNAL FINANCING IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE ECB’S HALF-YEARLY SURVEY
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their business fell again, becoming the factor, among all those 
included in the question, cited by the lowest number of firms (10% 
of the total, a proportion similar to that of the euro area as a whole 
and the lowest figure recorded since the survey was launched in 
2009). Finding customers was the predominant concern (selected 
by 32% of firms), followed by competition (18%).
In this setting, the proportion of Spanish firms that requested bank 
loans fell by some 4 pp, down to 32%, slightly above the figure for the 
euro area as a whole (30%). In turn, the availability of bank financing 
continued to improve (see Chart 2). Thus, in net terms, 30% of firms 
reported an increase in this respect, identical to the previous survey 
and 20 pp above the figure for their euro area peers. In addition, SMEs 
perceived positive developments in most factors affecting the supply 
of credit. Specifically, in net terms, 39% reported greater willingness of 
banks to provide credit (2 pp more than in the previous survey) and 
16% signalled an improvement in macroeconomic prospects (18 pp 
less than six months earlier).
The proportion of Spanish SMEs whose requests for bank 
financing were rejected declined by 4 pp compared with the 
previous six months, standing at 5%, below the figure for the euro 
area as a whole (8%). An improvement is also perceived when a 
broader indicator of difficulties obtaining bank loans is considered.1 
Those difficulties affected 12% of Spanish SMEs, which is slightly 
more than for the euro area as a whole (11%) and 1 pp less than 
six months earlier (see Chart 3).
Regarding financing conditions, the net percentage of SMEs that 
reported a drop in interest rates was positive for the third 
consecutive six-month period, standing at a high 40%, 11 pp 
more than in the previous period (see Chart 4). In addition, the net 
proportion of firms that reported an increase in loan amount and 
loan maturity remained positive (22% and 9%, respectively). In the 
case of collateral requirements and other terms and conditions of 
financing, the tightening perceived by Spanish SMEs continued to 
moderate and was lower than that perceived by SMEs in the euro 
area as a whole.
To conclude, the latest SAFE shows that, between October 2015 
and March 2016, access of Spanish SMEs to external financing 
continued to improve. As their economic and financial situation 
became progressively sounder they reported, overall, that in the 
period they perceived an increase in the availability of bank 
financing and a greater willingness of banks to provide credit on 
more favourable conditions. Lastly, the survey also shows that 
Spanish SMEs expected their access to bank financing to improve 
in the period April-September 2016.
BOX 6 RECENT CHANGES IN ACCESS OF SPANISH SMES TO EXTERNAL FINANCING IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE ECB’S HALF-YEARLY SURVEY (cont’d)
1  This indicator reflects the proportion of firms in any of the following 
situations: firms whose applications for financing were rejected; firms 
that did not receive all the funding they had requested; firms that
   received bank loans but at what they considered to be a very high cost; 
and firms that did not request financing because they believed it would 
probably not be approved (fear of rejection).
